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I. INTRODUCTION*
On October 1, 1975 the criminal justice system of the Commonwealth
of Virginia began to operate under revised codes of criminal law and procedure. Enacted during the last legislative session, Titles 18.2 and 19.2 contain an impressive array of new laws with which judges, lawyers, and law
enforcement officers should quickly become familiar. In many instances,
these new laws go far beyond recodification of existing laws. Several represent substantive changes which are quite controversial and remain hotly
debated since the close of the legislative session.
To redirect our thinking in terms of the new statutory provisions will
require a determined effort on the part of every practitioner of the criminal
law. Continuing legal education programs throughout the state will surely
assist in smoothing the transition, as did programs on the new laws at bar
association meetings earlier this year.
For Virginia lawyers who might not have followed the proposed changes
as they were being debated and enacted, and who might not have studied
Titles 18.2 and 19.2, a number of the key changes brought about by the
1975 revision are outlined here. While the treatment of Titles 18.2 and 19.2
is not intended to be exhaustive, practitioners will greatly benefit from the
careful highlighting done in the following material.

II.

1975 REVISION OF TITLE 18.1

Although the 1975 revision of Title 18.1 of the Virginia Code was primarily a recodification of existing Virginia law, substantive changes were made
in five major areas: (1) classification of offenses and designation of punishment; (2) capital punishment; (3) rape; (4) abortion; and (5) gambling. In
addition, new laws dealing with criminal solicitation, felony homicide, and
drunken driving were enacted.' Certain sections of Title 18.1 were deleted,
while other sections of the Code were transferred into Title 18.2 in an
attempt to combine all criminal provisions in one title.' The following
discussion will deal only with major substantive changes in Title 18.2 and
*Introduction by Andre A. Moenssens, Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond.
The student contributors are Daniel R. McGarry, William J. McGowan, Deborah S.
O'Toole, and Alan M. Salsbury.
1. See VA. CODE COMM'N REPORT, REVISION OF TITLE 18.1 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 13-19 (H.
Del. Doc. No. 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited as CODE COMM'N REPORT] for a complete listing of
comparative section numbers from Title 18.1 to 18.2; sections deleted, added, and those
sections brought into Title 18.2 from other parts of the Code.
2. Id. at 1.
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will examine potential problems raised by the revised Code.
A.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES AND DESIGNATION OF PUNISHMENT

Title 18.2 has categorized criminal offenses within six classes of felonies 3
and four classes of misdemeanors' with specific punishments designated
for each class.5 As a result, the needless repetition of punishment for each
separate offense is avoided, as is the problem raised by the sometimes
extreme divergence heretofore existing between minimum and maximum
penalties for each offense. The consolidation of punishments within classes
also diminishes the discretionary sentencing power of the judge and jury.6
Unlike the first two misdemeanor classes, there is no provision for punishment by imprisonment contained in classes three and four.' The lack
of such provision relieves the state from the responsibility of appointing
counsel for indigent defendants charged with class three or four misde3. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 19 (§ 18.2-9 (1)).
4. Id. (§ 18.2-9 (2)).
5. Id. at 19-20.
§ 18.2-10. Punishment for conviction of felony. -The authorized punishments for
conviction of a felony are:
(a) for class 1 felonies, death.
(b) for class 2 felonies, imprisonment for life or for any term not less than twenty
years.
(c) for class 3 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than five years nor more
than twenty years.
(d) for class 4 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than two years nor more
than ten years.
(e) for class 5 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more
than ten years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a
jury, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars, either or both.
(f) for class 6 felonies, a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than
five years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without a jury,
confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, either or both.
§ 18.2-11. Punishment for conviction of misdemeanor.-The authorized punishments
for conviction of a misdemeanor are:
(a) for class 1 misdemeanors, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months
and a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, either or both.
(b) for class 2 misdemeanors, confinement in jail for not more than six months and
a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, either or both.
(c) for class 3 misdemeanors, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
(d) for class 4 misdemeanors, a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.
6. This broad discretionary sentencing power was the basis for striking down the death
penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Code Comission recognized the
possible application of the Furmanrationale to other sentencing provisions. See CODE COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. For a complete discussion of the classification system see 9 U.
RIcH. L. REv. 415 (1975).
7. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 20 (§ 18.2-11(c),(d)).
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meanors as required by the doctrine of Argersinger v. Hamlin,8 a potential
source of savings for the state treasury. Under the former Code, a judge
had to appoint counsel if, before hearing any evidence, he anticipated that
a prison sentence might be warranted. If he did not so appoint, he was then
precluded from imposing a jail term on the defendant no matter how
aggravated the offense might later appear as the evidence developed.' This
anomaly, suggested in Justice Powell's concurrence in Argersinger,'° is
eliminated in Title 18.2 by the lack of provision for jail time for class three
and four misdemeanants.
B.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

The Code Commission Report" notes that the United States Supreme
Court decision in Furman v. Georgia 2 necessitated a revision of Virginia
law concerning capital offenses. The former Code, in Title 18.1, allowed
discretionary imposition of the death penalty for at least ten offenses. Title
18.2 eliminates such discretion and mandates death in three instances-killing a kidnap victim, killing for hire, and killing by a prison inmate."3
It appears that even this revised form may again be affected by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of several amendments to the Constitution. The landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia" raised almost as many
questions as it answered. Two justices of the five man majority, Justices
Brennan and Marshall, found the death penalty unconstitutional per se;
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and White held that the death penalty as applied in Furman constituted cruel 'and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth amendment because of the discretion allowed the judge and jury
in imposing the death penalty.5 This lack of unity in the Court's position
ensured that the issue would again be before them and left the states
uncertain about their interim capital offense laws.
6
In Fowler v. North Carolina,'
the capital punishment case currently
before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Robert Bork, appearing for

8. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). According to Argersinger, the state must appoint counsel for indigents charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment.
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. at 25.
11. CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 22 (§ 18.2-31).
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. For a more detailed discussion of capital punishment in general and Furmanv. Georgia
in particular, see 9 U. RicH. L. REv. 415 (1975); CapitalPunishment Statutes After Furman,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 651 (1974); Note, CapitalPunishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97 (1972).
16. 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803, cert. granted, 95 S.Ct. 223 (1974).
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the United States as amicus curiae, has asked the Court for a clarification
of the Furmanrule to the effect that the death penalty is per se constitutional." In oral argument, Stanford Law Professor Anthony Amsterdam
argued on behalf of Fowler that peace time imposition of the death penalty
on a civilian is cruel and unusual punishment per se, and that the infrequent imposition of the death penalty suggests general rejection by American society.'" He further argued that the North Carolina death penalty
procedure allows the exercise of uncontrolled discretion considered fatal by
three Justices in Furman.'"However, the discretionary practices noted by
Amsterdam-prosecutorial discretion (as evidenced by plea bargaining);
non-reviewable gubernatorial power to grant executive clemency; and
vaguely drawn distinctions between capital and non-capital offenses 2"-are
all so deeply ingrained in the American criminal justice system that their
elimination would be extremely difficult.
Deputy Attorney General Jean A. Benoy of North Carolina argued that
there was no indication that the discretion exercised by prosecutors and
the governor had been abused. Further, the fact that thirty-one states have
enacted death penalty statutes since Furmanindicates that society has not
rejected capital punishment.2' Benoy noted that the death penalty was
specifically contemplated by the framers in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments;2 if it is in fact obsolete, the proper remedy is constitutional
amendment rather than judicial pronouncement.?
Reacting to the complexity of the issues raised by Fowler, the Court has
scheduled the case for reargument in the October, 1975 term. 24 In determining the effect a decision for Fowler would have on the new Virginia
capital punishment statute, it may be significant that the statute is more
narrowly drawn than both the former Virginia statute and that under
consideration in Fowler.? But if Amsterdam's reasoning is ultimately accepted by the Court, and the discretion inherent in the criminal process
cannot otherwise be eliminated, the death penalty will be declared unconstitutional per se. This result seems unlikely given the ideological posture
of the present Supreme Court, the fact that only two Justices on the
Furman Court found the death penalty unconstitutional per se, and the
presence of the same Justices to decide Fowler.
17. 43 U.S.L.W. 1166 (U.S., Apr. 29, 1975).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
43 U.S.L.W. 1166 (U.S., Apr. 29, 1975).
Id.

22. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV.

23. 43 U.S.L.W. 1166 (U.S., Apr. 29, 1975).
24. 43 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S., June 23, 1975).
25. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 22 with VA.
Supp. 1975) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1974).

CODE ANN.

§ 18.1-21 (Cum.
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NEW OFFENSES ADDED

1. CriminalSolicitation
The Virginia General Assembly filled a substantive void in the statutory
criminal law by enacting a criminal solicitation statute" making it a class
six felony to "command, entreat or otherwise attempt to persuade another
person to commit a felony."" It is submitted this law raises at least two
significant problems: first, there is no apparent requirement that the actor
actually intend that the subject of his "persuasion" perpetrate the felony
and second, the statute makes no distinction for purposes of punishment
between degrees of seriousness of the felony solicited.
Other states which have criminal solicitation statutes,28 and the Model
Penal Code," have included the requirement that the solicitor have actual
intent that the person solicited commit a felony. Indeed, some states also
require that specific conduct which would constitute a crime be solicited."0
It is equally anomalous that the statute makes no distinction based on
the seriousness of the offense solicited. Other jurisdictions have designated
degrees of criminal solicitation3 under the obvious rationale that one who
solicits another to destroy public records 2 should not be given the same
sentence as one who solicits another to commit murder.

26. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 21 (§ 18.2-29). In Wiseman v. Commonwealth,
143 Va. 631, 637-39, 130 S.E. 249, 250-52 (1925), common law solicitation was defined as
"inciting to crime" and distinguished from an attempt to commit a crime by the presence of
an overt act. If there is an overt act in the commission of a crime, it is an attempt and not
solicitation.
27. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 21 (§ 18.2-29). Until the recent enactment of
Virginia's criminal solicitation statute, acts of this nature were treated as inchoate offenses,
e.g., conspiracy. For a general commentary on inchoate crimes in Virginia, see Reforming the
Law of Inchoate Crimes, 59 VA. L. REv. 1234 (1973). The statutory format advocated in this
article was not adopted by the General Assembly. See also, Sobel, Anticipatory Offenses in
the New Penal Law: Criminal Solicitation, Conspiracy, Attempt, and Facilitation,32
BROOKLYN L. REV. 257 (1966); 4 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 138 (1973); Attempt, Solicitation,and

Conspiracyunder the Proposed California Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 603 (1972).
28. CAL. PENAL LAW § 653(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1975); COLO. REv. ST. AN. § 18-2-301
(1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 501-13 (1974 Rev.); ILL. STAT. ANN., ch. 38, § 8-1 (a) (1972);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100.00 et seq. (McKinney 1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 629:2 (1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-115 (Cum. Supp. 1974); TEx. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 15.03 (1974); Wisc.

STAT. ANN. § 939.30 (1958).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
30. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.435 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,902 (1973); Tax. CODE
ANN. tit. 4, § 15.03 (1974); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100.00 et seq. (McKinney 1975); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 939.30 (1958).

32. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 32 (§ 18.2-107).
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Felony Homicide

The 1975 Virginia General Assembly also enacted a felony homicide
statute13 which, to a great extent, simply codifies the common law felony/murder rule. 34 The felony/murder rule was primarily developed as a
procedural tool to aid in the establishment of the requisite mens rea where
a person intends to commit a felony, and during its commission or attempted commission there is an otherwise accidental homicide. Under the
felony/murder rule, the killing is considered murder rather than manslaughter because of the felonious intent "transferred" from the underlying
felony."
Virginia has no case law developing the felony/murder concept because
such conduct constituted a violation of section 18.1-21, the homicide statute encompassing homicide committed in attempting or perpetrating a
felony." Therefore those cases involving a killing during the perpetration
of a felony were decided by statutory interpretation rather than application of the common law ruleY
To fall within the ambit of section 18.2-33, an accidental killing must
have occurred while in the prosecution of some felonious act other than
those enumerated in the first degree homicide statute.38 Thus, by its plain
language, there is no requirement that the underlying felonious act be one
inherently dangerous to human life. This element has wisely been supplied
both by statute," and case law4" in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the
33. Id. at 22 (§ 18.2-33).
34. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, CRmuNAL LAW 37 (2d ed. 1969); cf. Ritz, Felony Murder, Transferred Intent, and the Palsgraf Doctrine in the Criminal Law, 16 WASH. & LEE L. Rlv. 169
(1959); Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 453 (1955).
35. See note 34 supra.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-21 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
37. See, e.g., Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 198 S.E.2d 603 (1973) (attempted
robbery); Williams v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 338, 200 S.E.2d 579 (1973) (robbery); Wooden
v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 629, 159 S.E.2d 623 (1968) (robbery); Timmons v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 205, 129 S.E.2d 697 (1963) (rape).
38. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 22 (§ 18.2-33) (emphasis added).
39. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25.3
(McKinney 1967). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
which substitutes a rebuttable presumption of implied malice for the felony/murder rule.
40. Most jurisdictions have merged into the felony/murder rule a requirement that the
underlying felony attempted or perpetrated must be one inherently or foreseeably dangerous,
under the circumstances, to human life. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185
S.E.2d 666 (1972); Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. Sup. 1967); People v. Golson, 32 Ill.
2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1965).
Felonies which have been found inherently dangerous to human life, and thus within the
ambit of the felony/murder doctrine are: People v. Calzada, 13 Cal. App. 3d 603, 91 Cal. Rptr.
912 (1970) (driving under the influence of drugs); People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 75
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statute does not require demonstration of a causal connection between the
killing and the underlying felony. Thus, a person who kills a darting child
while driving his car with due care and within the speed limit to mail a
forged check may then be convicted of second degree murder under the
felony homicide statute. This result could be avoided by including in the
statute the requirement of a causal connection between the felony and the
killing. Other jurisdictions have established the causation requirement by
judicial pronouncement.'
It is submitted that Virginia would achieve needed savings in court time
and expense by amending the felony homicide statute to require that the
underlying felonious act be both inherently dangerous to human life and
causally related to the homicide."2
3. Driving While Intoxicated
The new "drunk driving" statute, 3 passed as emergency legislation and
Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969) (furnishing restricted drugs); People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402
P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965) (robbery); State v. Doss, 279 N.C. 413, 183 S.E.2d 671
(1971) (sodomy by threatening with knife and gun); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 176 S.E.2d
765 (1970) (escape by convict); State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 513 (1950) (unlawful
abortion).
Those felonies held not inherently dangerous include: People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489
P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971) (possession of concealed weapon by an ex-convict); People
v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966) (grand theft); People v.
Paulic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924) (violation of liquor law).
41. State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P.2d 879 (1967); State v. Thompson, 28 N.C. 202,
185 S.E.2d 666 (1972) (chain of causation); Buel v. People, 78 N.Y. 492, 497 (1879) ("but for"
test of causation).
42. Cf. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1969).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Probation, education and rehabilitation of person charged with driving while
intoxicated, etc. - (a) Upon the trial of any person for a violation of § 18.2-266, or
any ordinance of a county, city or town similar to the provisions thereof, and upon
motion of the defendant, the court may order probation to the defendant, on condition
that he be assigned to a driver education program, and, in the discretion of the court,
to an alcohol treatment or rehabilitation program, or both such programs. Such trial
may be continued for a period up to one year and during such time of continuance the
court may:
(1) Require the defendant to cooperate in any investigation conducted by any
probation officer assigned to the case or such other person working in a driver education program, and
(2) Require the defendant moving for probation under the provisions of this section
to pay a fee not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars, which amount shall be forwarded
by the clerk to be deposited with the State Treasurer. Fees shall be kept in a separate
fund in the State treasury for expenditure by the Highway Safety Division, for the
maintenance of the provisions set out in this section, for which such funds as may come
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in force since March 24, 1975, provides an innovative program of conditional probation, treatment, and rehabilitation of the drunk driver,
granted at the discretion of the court. 4 It delegates to the Virginia Highway
Safety Division authority to establish procedures and standards necessary
to implement this program. 5
Conspicuously absent on the face of the statute is any provision for
suspension or revocation of the probationer's operating license during his
rehabilitation period. It would therefore seem that one convicted of "drunk
driving" may be allowed lawful access to the highways during his treatto the State are hereby appropriated.
(b) If the court finds that the defendant is not eligible for probation or violates any
of the provisions of probation, the court shall dispose of the case as if no probation had
been ordered. If the court finds that the defendant has complied with its probation
order, such compliance may be accepted by the court in lieu of a conviction under §
18.2-266 or the requirements specified in § 18.2-271, upon payment of all fines and
costs, if any, as required by law.
(c) The State Treasurer or any city or county is authorized to accept any gifts or
bequests of money or property, and any grant, loan, service, payment or property from
any source, including the federal government, for the purpose of driver alcohol education. Any such gifts, bequests, grants, loans or payments shall be deposited in the
separate fund provided in (a) (2) hereof.
(d) The Highway Safety Division, or any county, city, town, or cities or any combination thereof may establish driver alcohol education programs and alcohol treatment
and rehabilitation programs in connection with highway safety. The Highway Safety
Division is authorized to establish standards and criteria for the implementation of
such programs. It may establish criteria for the modalities of administration of such
programs, as well as public information, accounting procedures and allocation of
funds. Funds paid to the State hereunder shall be utilized by the Division to offset
the costs of State and local probation, rehabilitation, administration, driver education
and public information. The Highway Safety Division shall establish standards of
evaluation for the programs set out herein, and shall submit an annual report as to its
actions taken at the close of each calendar year to the Governor and the General
Assembly.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the exercise by a court of
its authority to make any lawful disposition of a charge of a violation of § 18.2-266 or
a similar offense under any county, city or town ordinance.
44. This statute authorizes a program modeled after the federally sponsored Fairfax Alcohol Safety Action Project (ASAP) now in operation in Fairfax County, Virginia, and implemented through the Fairfax General District Court. See VA. HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVSION, D.W.I.
ARREsT-A BRIEF GUIDE TO ASAP AND THE COURTS (1975).
45. According to Mr. Walter Douglas, Assistant Director of the Virginia Highway Safety
Division, there are now seven operational ASAP centers. Guidelines for implementing these
ASAP programs are presently being formulated. The procedure begins with a sixty to ninety
day planning grant of ten to twenty thousand dollars, through which the state and local
authorities cooperate in planning and implementing local ASAP treatment programs.
Interview with Mr. Walter Douglas, Virginia Highway Safety Division, in Richmond, Virginia, June 20, 1975.
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ment period. However, subsection (e) of the statute," which preserves the
authority of the trial court to make "any lawful disposition" of the case
before it, is being interpreted by local courts to permit judges to suspend
or revoke licenses during the probation period."
The wording of the statute in subsection (a), "upon the trial of any
person,"48 raises a potential problem as well. The courts have disagreed on
the proper construction of this phrase" which purports to specify the authorized procedure for implementing the probation program. In the Fairfax
Alcohol Safety Action Project (ASAP), prior to the enactment of section
18.2-271.1, the defendant's motion for acceptance into the ASAP probation
program was made during the pre-trial procedures." This practice served
to eliminate the time and expense of actually going to trial before a defendant could be assigned to the ASAP program.
The statute's provision that successful completion of probation may be
accepted by the court in lieu of a conviction creates an equally perplexing
problem, since the courts have generally required a guilty plea and convic51
tion before assigning the defendant to the ASAP program.
Virginia's ASAP program is breaking new ground in state treatment
programs for drinking drivers.5 2 The need for flexibility in approach to the
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(e) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
47. Telephone interview with Mr. Barent Landstreet, Project Manager of Fairfax ASAP,
June 20, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Landstreet Interview].
This interpretation may represent a judicial attempt to remedy a legislative oversight
rather than a result dictated by sound statutory construction. Subsection (e) was probably
intended to assure that judges were not compelled to prescribe rehabilitation .where another
disposition, such as acquittal or outright license revocation without rehabilitation, was
deemed warranted. It is submitted the legislature could have avoided this strained interpretation by explicitly providing in subsection (e) that courts could dispose of the charge of a
violation of § 18.2-266 (drunk driving) by invoking § 18.2-271.1 (rehabilitation in addition to
any other lawful disposition, i.e., license revocation).

48.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 18.2-271.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).

49. According to Mr. Landstreet, different courts have developed various interpretations
of this language. In the Fairfax program only after a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the
court, can probation under section 18.2-271.1 be granted on a pre-sentence basis. Some courts
have chosen to deal with this program by ordering probation, after a plea of guilty or a finding
of guilt, at the sentencing. Arlington, Virginia, has chosen to continue to implement this
program during the pre-trial procedures. Other courts have implemented section 18.2-271.1
by agreeing to suspend the defendant's jail term if he chooses to participate in the ASAP
program. Landstreet Interview, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-271.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); Landstreet Interview, supra note
47.
52. New York and California have statutes dealing with driver training and rehabilitation
generally, but these statutes do not deal specifically with the problem of drinking drivers.
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problem of drunk drivers has long been recognized," and this law is a
useful tool in achieving this flexibility. However, perhaps because of the
speed with which it was passed, the statute is rather poorly drafted. It is
submitted that the General Assembly should amend this statute to clearly
reflect its intent, rather than leaving clarification to the courts.
D.

RAPE

1. Forcible Rape
The Code Commission's proffered revision of the state rape laws included a division of forcible rape into two categories: (1) rape accompanied
by serious bodily injury or by the use of a deadly weapon or by a threat to
use such a weapon with a display thereof; and (2) rape absent the concomitants specified in the first category." The General Assembly accepted this
categorization in its package passage of Title 18.2,11 but reduced the punishments for these crimes from those which the Commission had suggested." However, later in the same session, the legislature passed amendatory legislation to be incorporated into Title 18.2 which superseded the
earlier passed rape sections.57 Under the new sections, there is no classification of forcible rape into separate crimes with different punishments."
See CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13368 (West Cum. Supp. 1975); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAmc LAW §§
520-23 (McKinney 1975).

53. See, e.g., Beresford, Group Therapy for Chronic Violators, 7 TsAL 42 (March/April,
1971); Little, Administration of Justice in Drunk Driving Cases, 58 A.B.A.J. 950 (1972);
Zylman, The Alcohol Safety Counter Measures Program:A Panacea or Pandora'sBox, 19
TRAFFIC DIG. & REv. 16 (1971).
54. CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 13, 32 (§ 18.2-61).
55. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 25 (§§ 18.2-61 to -62). The General Assembly
modified the Commission's suggested punishments, infra note 56, by prescribing the aggravated rape of the first category as a class 2 felony, and the lesser form of rape under the second
category as a class 3 felony. This modification in punishment became nugatory upon the
subsequent abrogation of the division of rape into two categories. See notes 57, 58 and
accompanying text infra.
56. The rationale behind the Commission's recommendation of a division of forcible rape
into two categories is explained by its apparent desire to retain capital punishment for the
offense. Believing the death penalty to be the appropriate punishment for forcible rape in
certain instances, the Commission suggested its retention as the sole punishment for the
aggravated form of rape under the first category, while the lesser form of rape under the
second category would be punishable as a class 2 felony. See note 54 and accompanying text
supra; CODE COMW'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 32 (§ 18.2-61).
57. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1265-67 (§§ 18.2-61 to -67).
58. Id. at 1265 (§ 18.2-61). This amending of legislation passed earlier in the same session
shows that the legislators' apparent plan was to pass Title 18.2 as a package early in the
session, with undesirable provisions to be dealt with during the balance of the legislative
period.
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Title 18.1 allowed discretionary imposition of the death penalty for forcible rape, 9 an unconstitutional provision under Furman v. Georgia." The
legislature could have constitutionally retained capital punishment in
Title 18.2 by prescribing it as the sole penalty for the offense, 6 but instead
it chose to allow the court or jury, in its discretion, to impose a punishment
2
ranging from a term of not less than five years to life imprisonment.
Under Title 18.2, a female under thirteen legally does not have the
capacity to consent to an act of sexual intercourse.13 Therefore, the carnal
knowledge of a female under this age is considered an act of forcible rape,
even though actual consent be present. 4 The use of force is constructively
deemed present in such an instance. 5 Because it is classified as forcible
rape, the defendant in such a case faces the same range of punishment as
does one who carnally knows a female against her will and by force. 6 The
parallel provision under Title 18.1 applied to females under the age of
sixteen. 7 The legislature apparently felt that this age was outdated,
prompting the three year reduction noted above.
2. Statutory Rape
The General Assembly set the age of fifteen as the age of lawful female
consent to sexual intercourse. 8 The carnal knowledge of a female under
59.

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
60. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Code Commission noted that there was "little question" of
the unconstitutionality of the state death penalty provision for rape under Title 18.1. CODE
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. See also I B supra.
61. While the Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), is
susceptible of divergent interpretations, the Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that the decision does not render constitutionally infirm a non-discretionary, mandatory death penalty.
Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 747, 749, 204 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1974). See also II B supra.
The Code Commission had recommended the death penalty as the sole punishment for the
aggravated form of rape which it proposed, but the General Assembly rejected this suggested
retention of capital punishment. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra; note 62 and
accompanying text infra.
62. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1265 (§ 18.2-61).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. For cases holding that a female's actual consent and the absence of actual force are
immaterial when she is under the legal age of consent, see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Repl.
Vol. 1960).
66. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1265 (§ 18.2-61). The Code Commission had
recommended that the carnal knowledge of a female under the age of seven, although it be
nonforcible and with actual consent, be punishable solely by death as a class 1 felony. CODE
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 32 (§ 18.2-61).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
68. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1265 (§ 18.2-63). The General Assembly followed
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fifteen but at least thirteen years of age, although it be an act of consensual
sexual intercourse, is punishable as a class 4 felony.69 However, if the
accused is a minor and the consenting female is three years or more his
junior, the act is punishable as a class 6 felony; if the consenting female
be less than three years the junior of the accused minor, the act is punishable as violative of the fornication statute." Consensual sexual intercourse with a female under thirteen is not considered statutory rape, but
is punishable as an instance of forcible rape."
Under Title 18.1, the possible punishment for the carnal knowledge of a
female patient or pupil of certain institutions ranged from imprisonment
for not less than five years to death. 2 The statute made no exception for
cases in which the accused could not have known that the female was such
a patient or pupil. Under Title 18.2, the state must show that the accused
knew or had good reason to believe that the female was such a patient or
pupil, or that she was on furlough with convalescent status.73 Upon proof
thereof, the act is punishable as a class 3 felony."
the recommendation of the Code Commission, which stated that "due to the increase in
knowledge in sex matters by females under the age of sixteen, the age of sixteen as the age
of lawful consent to sexual intercourse is out of date, and the Commission's proposals in this
respect fix the age at fifteen." CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. The designated age
under Title 18.1 was sixteen. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
69. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1265 (§ 18.2-63).
70. Id. at 1265-66 (Q18.2-63). For a comparison with the statutory rape provision submitted
by the Code Commission, prescribing different ages and penalties, see CODE COrCm'N REPORT,
supra note 1, at 32-33 (§ 18.2-63). Under Title 18.1, statutory rape applied when the consenting female was between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, with punishment ranging from one
to twenty years in prison. No qualifications existed for defendants who were minors. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.1-44 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Fornication, occurring when a nonmarried person voluntarily has sexual intercourse with
any other person, is punishable under Title 18.2 as a class 4 misdemeanor. Va. Acts of
Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 76 (§ 18.2-344).
71. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Cum. Supp. 1975). These institutions include those for
mentally deranged females, as well as for those who are deaf, dumb, blind, feeble-minded,
or epileptics. Id.
73. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1266 (§ 18.2-64). The Code Commission noted
that "the practice of furlough of females, who, to all appearances and manifestations, are in
complete control of their volition, places an unwarranted liability on an accused who has no
reason to believe that the female is an inmate of such an institution." CODE COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 1, at 3.
74. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1266 (§ 18.2-64). This punishment is a substantial reduction from that designated under Title 18.1, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
The General Assembly passed the new provision dealing with institutionalized females in the
same form as the one submitted by the Code Commission. CODE CO m'N REPORT. supra note
1, at 33 (§ 18.2-64).
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The only other consequential change in the rape laws deals with the
deposition of a prosecutrix. Under Title 18.1, the judge alone had the
discretion to order the taking of the prosecutrix' deposition to be read
subsequently in court in lieu of oral testimony.7 5 Title 18.2 retains this
section, but with the added condition that the consent of the accused,
7
obtained in open court, be a prerequisite to the taking of the deposition. 1
E. ABORTION
1. General
The abortion article passed by the General Assembly under Title 18.2 7
is tailored to meet the constitutional dictates handed down by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 7s and its companion case. 7 A woman, upon

her request, may obtain an abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy if performed by a physician licensed to practice medicine and surgery by the Virginia State Board of Medicine." Such an abortion likewise
is lawful during the second trimester of pregnancy, if performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health and Mental Retardation.'
This statutory location requirement is valid since the Court in Roe asserted
that a state may regulate abortion procedures in ways reasonably related
75.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 18.1-47 (Repl. Vol. 1960).

76. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 606, at 1266-67 (§ 18.2-67). The General Assembly
apparently felt that the prosecutrix' physical appearance on the witness stand is of such
importance that the consent of the accused be obtained before the witness' deposition be
taken to be read in court in lieu of oral testimony.
77. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 26 (§§ 18.2-71 to -76.2).
78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court struck down as violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment a Texas criminal abortion statute proscribing abortion without
reference to gestation periods, unless used as a life saving procedure. Id. For a discussion of
the 1973 Supreme Court abortion cases and their background, see 8 U. RcH. L. Rv. 75 (1973).
79. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Court struck down various abortion procedural
requirements in a Georgia statute as violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 191-201.
See note 84 infra for a brief discussion of the case.
80. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 26 (§ 18.2-72). Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
165 (1973), a state may stipulate that the physician currently be licensed by the state.
Under Title 18.1, abortions were obtainable when the pregnancy resulted from incest or
forcible rape, as well as when the child was likely to be born with an irremediable and
incapacitating defect. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Under the new legislation, where abortion is freely obtainable during certain gestation periods, it became unnecessary to specify these instances. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.However, under
Title 18.1 they had been the only circumstances under which an abortion could be performed
other than when necessary to save the woman's life or to prevent the substantial impairment
of her health. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62.1, -62.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975). This was patently
unconstitutional under Roe, thus necessitating a revision of the abortion law.
81. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 26-27 (§ 18.2-73).
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to maternal health during this period of gestation.82 Abortion is proscribed
subsequent to the second trimester, except where the continuation of pregnancy is likely to result in death or serious and irremediable injury to the
woman." This diagnosis requires the concurrence of two consulting physicians in addition to the woman's physician.' However, a less stringent
emergency provision allows abortion whenever necessary to save the life of
the woman.8 5 Under this "catchall," the treating physician need not be
licensed specifically by the Virginia. State Board of Medicine, and there is
neither the requirement of a two-doctor concurrence in the diagnosis nor a
mandatory location at which the abortion must be performed8 6
2.

Other Provisions

A "conscience clause" of questionable constitutionality allows any medical facility to deny admittance to a patient for the purpose of an abortion,
and allows any individual to abstain from participating in an abortion
procedure for any reason."7 The woman's express written consent is re82. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
83. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 27 (§ 18.2-74).
84. Id. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198-200 (1973), the Court invalidated the procedural
requirement in a Georgia abortion statute stipulating a two-doctor concurrence in the female's physician's diagnosis that an abortion was necessary to prevent substantial impairment to the health of the woman.
The decision would appear to render constitutionally infirm the two-doctor concurrence
clause under the new Virginia statute. However, the Georgia statute lacked references to the
several trimesters of the pregnancy, and it is thus possible to interpret Doe as invalidating a
two-doctor concurrence clause only when such a provision is not confined to a trimester of
pregnancy other than the first one, when the state may regulate abortion procedures in a
manner reasonably related to maternal health. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 114, 164 (1973). Under
this rather tortuous interpretation, the Virginia two-doctor concurrence clause, confined to a
period other than the first trimester, is constitutional.
The Court in Doe also invalidated a residency requirement imposed on the woman before
she could obtain an abortion, as well as a provision requiring a hospital staff abortion committee's prior approval of the procedure. 410 U.S. at 200. Under Title 18.1, Virginia had both
such requirements. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
85. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 27 (§ 18.2-74.1).
86. Id.
87. Id. (§ 18.2-75). See Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 891 (1974), where the Eighth Circuit invalidated a municipal hospital's resolution
banning the use of its facilities for non-therapeutic abortions. Citing the Supreme Court
abortion decisions, supra notes 78, 79 and accompanying text, the court stated: "It would be
a nonsequitur to say that the abortion decision and its effectuation is an election to be made
by the physician and his patient without interference by the state and then allow the state,
through its public hospitals, to effectively bar the physician from using state facilities to
perform the operation." 495 F.2d at 1346. The court found no "compelling circumstances" to
justify the hospital's resolution. Id.
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quired prior to an abortion." The encouragement or promotion of illegal
8 9
abortions is banned.
Apparently apprehensive of judicial invalidation of one or more of the
abortion sections, the legislature included in the article a severability
clause stating that any such invalidation should be confined as narrowly
as possible without impairing the remainder of the abortion article. 0

F. GAMBLING
Although the gambling statutes under Title 18.21' represent a complete
revision of the previous law,92 the emphasis lies in the updating of format
rather than the alteration of substance.93 Two sections of Title 18.1, believed to be either unnecessary or inappropriate, have been deleted, while
in other instances several sections under the old law have been joined to
form single sections. 5
The most noteworthy modification is found in the section defining illegal
gambling, gambling devices, and operators. Under Title 18.1, provisions
88. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 27 (§ 18.2-76). Under Title 18.1, the written
consent of the husband was required in addition to that of the woman when the abortion was
to be performed because of likelihood that the child would be born with an irremediable and
incapacitating defect. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62(e) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Because the decision
is based on the woman's right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), can be read to
invalidate any provision calling for the husband's consent as an infringement of this right.
89. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 27 (§ 18.2-76). The Supreme Court recently
invalidated a Virginia statute which had been used in 1971 to convict a defendant newspaper
editor for having published an advertisement stating that abortions were legal in New York
for non-residents of that city. Bigelow v. Virginia, 43 U.S.L.W. 4734 (U.S. June 16, 1975).
The statute was held violative of the first amendment guarantee of free speech. Id. at 473739. The statute had imposed a blanket restriction on advertisements encouraging the procurement of an abortion. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Repl. Vol. 1960). The legislature amended the
section in 1972 to ban the encouragement or promotion of only those abortions prohibitedin
Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Cum. Supp. 1975). This section exists under Title 18.2 in
substantially identical form. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 27 (§ 18.2-76.1).
90. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 27 (§ 18.2-76.2).
91. Id. at 72-76 (§§ 18.2-325 to -340).
92. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-314 to -343 (Repl. Vol. 1960); id. §§ 18.1-316, -318.1, -319, -329,
-330, -331, -340, -341 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
93. See CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
94. One of these deleted sections construed as remedial the laws against gaming, while the
other had stipulated an attorney's fee of $10.00 to be taxed in cases of gambling convictions.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-314, -315 (Repl. Vol. 1960). See CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1,
at 5.
95. See CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 100-04, which lists after each of the recommended new sections, subsequently passed in substantially the same form by the General
Assembly, the sections of Title 18.1 upon which the new legislation is based.
96. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 72 (§ 18.2-325).
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concerning a variety of specifically named gambling devices and machines
were dealt with in separate sections, thus rendering difficult their analysis." The definitions of these gambling instrumentalities were unduly cumbersome." Furthermore, the legislature at different times was forced to
amend the old sections to deal with exigencies previously uncovered." The
new legislation does not attempt to define specific devices such as "slot
machines" or "punch boards." Instead, several sections from Title 18.1
were combined and rewritten into a single section which forms a comprehensive definition of gambling devices.' 0 This is intended to eliminate
special legislation to cover future forms of gambling.''
11.

1975 REVISION OF TITLE 19.1

The revision of the criminal procedure provisions of the Virginia Code
sought to accomplish two main objectives: (1) a redraft of certain prior
sections to conform with already existing Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia and recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court; and (2)
an alteration of the wording in some sections and the sequence in which
they appear to promote clarity and conciseness.' The following discussion
will consider only the more significant changes. Although the purpose of
this discussion is primarily to document changes, certain sections which
permit conflicting interpretations or adopt controversial policies will be
given more extensive coverage.
A.

CONSERVATORS OF THE PEACE AND SPECIAL POLICEMEN

Chapter 22 of the revised Code of criminal procedure concerns the duties,
powers and procedures for conservators of the peace and special policemen.
This subject area had been previously covered in Title 19.11 but its manner
of presentation made it difficult to interpret and apply.
97. See note 92 supra.
98. For example, see the definition of a slot machine under Title 18.1. VA. CODE ANN. §
18.1-331 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
99. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-316, -318.1, -319, -329 to -331, -340, -341 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
100. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 14, at 72 (§ 18.2-325).
101. Id. See CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
1. VA. CODE COhI'N REPORT, REVSION OF TrrLE 19.1 OF ThE CODE OF VIRGINIA 4 (H. Del.
CODE COMM'N REPORT].

Doc. No. 20, 1974) [hereinafter cited as

2. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 849-51 (§§ 19.2-19 to -25). Chapter 1 (§§ 19.2-1
to 11), which is mentioned in passing only, outlines the General Provisions for the title.
Section 19.2-6 is new and provides that when an appointive power is given to the judge of a
circuit court, that power will be vested in the circuit's chief judge. Id. at 848 (§ 19.2-6).
3. VA. CODE ANN. 99 19.1-20 to -32 (Repl. Vol. 1960), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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The revision of the subject is divided into three articles in an effort to
provide a more simplified and logical approach. Article 1' deals with the
appointment of conservators of the peace and special policemen; Article
21 describes the powers and procedures under which they are required to
function; and Article 36 provides an appeal procedure for those individuals
from whom a recognizance is required7 or who have been committed to jail
for failure to give security for such recognizance. Furthermore, several
important changes were made in the contents of these articles.
1. Appointment

All judges throughout the state and all magistrates within their geographical jurisdiction are automatically deemed conservators of the peace.'
Those who must be appointed to the position of conservator of the peace
are referred to as special conservators if appointed by the circuit court.'
The provisions for these special conservators have been changed. In Title
19.1, the legislature had attempted to list all the places in which a special
conservator of the peace could be appointed.'" Appointment depended on
whether the particular place involved was enumerated rather than on the
need for such an official. The 1975 revision does not attempt such a task
but rather authorizes their appointment upon application of the owner,
proprietor or custodian of any place, when there is a showing of a necessity
for the security of property or the peace." The special conservators of the
peace, within the area and time specified in their order of appointment,
have all the powers and duties of any other conservator of the peace.'
The new provisions also make it clear that the appointment of an employee as a special conservator of the peace does not relieve the employer
and principal from liability for wrongs this employee commits while acting
in the scope of his employment. 3 The special conservator is authorized to
4. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 849-50 (§§ 19.2-12 to -17).
5. Id. at 850 (§§ 19.2-18 to -23).
6. Id. at 850-51 (§§ 19.2-24,-25).
7. Article 2 of Chapter 2, Title 19.2 adopts procedures requiring persons to give a recognizance to keep the peace under certain circumstances. Id. at 850 (§§ 19.2-19 to -22). For a
discussion of recognizances in Virginia and the difference between a recognizance and a bail
bond see 2B MICHn'S JURISPRUDENCE Bail and Recognizance § 3 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
8. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 849 (§ 19.2-12). Others who are automatically
conservators of the peace are designated in id. (§ 19.2-14).
9. Id. (§ 19.2-13).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-28 (Cum. Supp. 1975) listed such areas as universities, great
gatherings of people, hospitals, penal institutions, etc.
11. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 849 (§ 19.2-13).
12. Id. For a discussion of a conservator's duties and powers see III
A 2 infra.
13. Id.
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act pursuant to statutory provisions and in this sense becomes an agent of
the state. However, since the employer has requested that his employee
have such status, the former remains vicariously liable. 4
2.

Powers and Procedures

Conservators of the peace have the power to arrest without a warrant in
two instances." First, a conservator has the power to arrest any person who
threatens to kill or injure another or threatens to commit acts of violence
or injury against another's person or property. 6 Conservators of the peace
are also authorized to make warrantless arrests of any person who commits
a crime in their presence or who they have probable cause to believe has
committed a felony.' However, the exercise of his power to arrest without
a warrant imposes upon the conservator of the peace a duty to follow
procedural paths set out elsewhere in Title 19.2.11
In short, these procedural rules require that the conservator, upon
arresting an individual for threatening violence or injury, immediately
take the arrestee before a magistrate or judge. 9 Similarly, if the arrest is
made upon a crime being committed in the conservator's presence, the
Code directs him to take the arrestee before "an officer authorized to issue
criminal warrants." In each case an impartial judicial officer makes the
decision whether to restrain the arrestee's freedom or release him.
These procedures represent a significant departure from the previous
Code. Formerly, a conservator of the peace could arrest without a warrant
upon a complaint that a person had threatened an offense against the
14. The new provision follows the majority of Virginia case law. See 1A McmHE's
JURISPRUDENcE Agency § 9 (Repl. Vol. 1967). See also Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Redd, 123 Va.
420, 96 S.E. 836 (1918).
15. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 850 (§ 19.2-18).
16. Id. (§ 19.2-19). The arrestee must be taken before a magistrate who determines whether

the arrestee has threatened to injure another person or his property. If he finds such a threat
was made, the magistrate may require the individual, under section 19.2-19, to give a recognizance to keep the peace. For a general discussion of recognizances to keep the peace see 3
MIcHIE's JURISPRUDENCE Breach of Peace § 6 (1949). For a criticism of peace bonds or recognizances see Note, Peace and Behavior Bonds-Summary Punishment for Uncommitted
Offenses, 52 VA. L. REv. 914 (1966).
17. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 865 (§ 19.2-81). Section 19.2-81 also authorizes

warrantless arrests where an individual is charged with a crime in another jurisdiction and
the officer is in receipt of a telegram, radio message, computer printout, etc. that provides
the individual's name or a description of the person wanted, the crime alleged, and an
allegation that such person is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. Id.
18. Id. at 850 (§ 19.2-18).
19. Id. at 850 (§19.2-22).
20. Id. at 865 (§19.2-82).
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person or property of another. However, the conservator also had the power
to issue warrants and hold a hearing to determine whether a recognizance
2
was required. '
The 1975 revision makes it clear that only a detached magistrate or judge
shall issue warrants and conduct the required hearings. This revision was
advocated by the Virginia Code Commission22 and necessitated by the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment,
requiring that warrants be issued by an independent judicial officer disengaged from the activities of law enforcement.3 Under Title 19.2, police and
judicial powers are in separate hands.
Title 19.1 had also given conservators of the peace the authority to
24
require from "persons not of good fame" security for their good behavior.
This behavior recognizance could be required from persons on a mere
showing of bad reputation as contrasted with the requirement in Title 19.2
of an actual threat against another's person or property.2 Such a behavior
bond based solely on the question of one's reputation has been severely
criticized.2 6 The 1975 revision accordingly has denied even magistrates and
judges the power to require such a recognizance.

B.

SEARCH WARRANTS

Chapter 527 of Title 19.2 is a revision of the prior law dealing with search
warrants." The revision states generally that a judge or other judicial
officer can issue a search warrant on the basis of a complaint or oath,
supported by an affidavit, if he is satisfied there is probable cause for the
21.

19.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
supra note 1, at 5.
23. The principle that warrants must be issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate is
well established. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (the rule that a warrant
be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate requires severance and disengagement from
activities of law enforcement); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrants
required to be issued by neutral and detached magistrates instead of being judged by officer
engaged in the often competitive business of ferreting out crime).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-20 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
25. See Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 850 (§ 19.2-19).
26. For a discussion and criticism of statutes requiring a bond for bad reputation, see Note,
Peace and Behavior Bonds-Summary Punishment for Uncommitted Offenses, 52 VA. L.
REv. 914 (1966).
27. Chapter 3 of Title 19.2 deals with magistrates and the operation of the magistrate
system. Chapter 4 deals with the subject of special magistrates. These sections contain only
minor changes from the provisions previously contained in Title 19.1. See Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 851-55 (§§ 19.2-26 to -51).
28. Search warrants were previously covered in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-83 to -89 (Repl. Vol.
1960), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1975).
VA. CODE ANN. §

22. See CODE

COMM'N REPORT,
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issuance of a warrant. 9 Search warrants can be issued for the search of
specified places, things and persons and the police may seize items within
several general categories, i.e., weapons or other objects used in the commission of crimes, contraband, fruits of crimes, and items constituting
evidence of a crime.30
There is no attempt to list with great specificity all the types .of items
for which a search warrant can be authorized. Title 19.1 had attempted to
provide such a listing,"1 but it was wholly incomplete and contained no
provisions for the seizure of "mere evidence." 32 The generic listings of Title
19.2 include .all the specific types of evidence and should eliminate the
necessity for continued revision of the Code section."
There has also been a change in the statutory requirements for the
affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant. Under Title 19.2,
there is an additional requirement that the affidavit must state that the
objects to be seized constitute evidence of the commission of the offense
named in the affidavit. 4
The portions of the revision governing the issuance of a general warrant
or a search warrant not supported by an affidavit, the contents of the
search warrant and to whom it is directed, the execution of the warrant,
and disposition of any property seized are essentially the same as provisions in Title 19.1.11 This means that the revision also fails to contain any
statutory provisions concerning "no knock entry" in executing a search
warrant. It appears that the legislature intends to allow the courts to slowly
29. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 855 (§ 19.2-52).
30. Id. (§ 19.2-53).
31. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-84 (Cum. Supp. 1975) which listed items such as spurious
coins, obscene books, lottery tickets, firecrackers, etc. Needless to say, to have a complete,
specific listing of items authorized to be seized would be a lengthy and difficult task.
32. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the United States Supreme Court declined
to uphold any distinctions between the lawful seizure of "mere evidence" and the fruits or
instrumentalities of crime.
33. The revision's categorization of items is fashioned after the language of VA. SuP. CT.
R. 3A:27(a), (c). It is interesting to note that although Title 19.2 and Rule 3A:27 state any
books, papers, or records can be seized without limitation, the Virginia Supreme Court has
previously ruled that no search warrant can be issued for the search and seizure of evidential
papers, holding this seizure is a violation of fifth amendment rights. See Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406 (1962).
34. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 855-56 (§ 19.2-54) with VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.1-85 (Cum. Supp. 1975). This additional phrase conforms to the language already contained in VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:27(b). See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 569, 179 S.E.2d
458 (1971) (the omission of the offense rendered the affidavit defective).
35. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 856 (§§ 19.2-55 to -58) with VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.1-86 to -89 (Repl. Vol. 1960), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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carve out guidelines in this controversial area."
The 1975 revision retains the section stating the general rule that a
warrant is required for a valid search; however, one instance is now designated when a warrantless search can be conducted.3 7 The area of warrantless searches has not previously received statutory coverage in Virginia,
except for a provision allowing officers empowered to enforce game laws to
enter for the purposes of police inspection. Section 19.2-59 provides that
an officer or other person, incident to a lawful arrest, may search without
a warrant, the person arrested, the open portion of a vehicle he is occupying
or any area easily within his grasping distance for evidence relating to the
offense for which he is being arrested and for weapons. This exception to
the warrant requirement is clearly well grounded under Chimel v.
3
California.

However, the authorization of only one type of warrantless search raises
the question of whether the legislature intended to exclude other significant exceptions such as: searches incident to full custodial arrest," war36. The Virginia Supreme Court has discussed "no knock entry" in several recent decisions. The initial Virginia decision in this area, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 102, 189
S.E.2d 678 (1972), upheld a "no knock entry" where the police had reason to believe that
illegal drugs could easily be destroyed or disposed of. For a discussion of the court's rationale
in Johnson, see CriminalProcedure, Survey of Developments in Virginia Law 1972-1973, 59
VA. L. REv. 1478, 1486 (1973); 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 565 (1973). The Virginia Supreme Court
recently upheld a "no knock entry" in Carratt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 55, 205 S.E.2d 653
(1974).
37. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-88 (Repl. Vol. 1960) with Va. Acts of Assembly 1975,
ch. 495, at 856-57 (§ 19.2-59).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-88 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
39. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the United States Supreme Court approved searches
incident to arrest of the person and the area within his grasp for weapons and easily destructible evidence:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order
to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by
a like rule . . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. Id. at 762-63.
40. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973). The Supreme Court, in Robinson, recognized a full search of the arrestee's person
incident to a lawful custodial arrest as a reasonable warrantless search.
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rantless searches of automobiles," and other exigent circumstances justifying warrantless searches,42 inventory searches,4" and seizures under the
plain view doctrine.44 No legislative history is available for the decision to
designate only one type of warrantless search, but it is reasonable to assume that other types of warrantless searches will continue to be upheld
on a case by case basis.

C. ARREST
Several noteworthy revisions were made in the laws on arrest in Chapter
745 in order to conform to other Code provisions, to existing rules of court

and to recent court decisions. The adoption of the magistrate system in
Virginia necessitated a change in the list of persons authorized to issue
process of arrest under Title 19.2.46 This change seems to be only a formality, yet it represents a long overdue increase in the emphasis placed on
uniformity within the Code.
Chapter 7 contains several revisions which adopt the language already
contained in the Virginia Supreme Court Rules. There are now provisions
for a more detailed description of exactly what an arrest warrant shall
recite and require. The warrant is required to be directed to an appropriate
officer or officers, to name the accused or set forth a description by which
he can be identified, to describe the offense charged with reasonable certainty, to be signed by the issuing officer and to command the accused be
41. Searches of automobiles have been a well recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The United States Supreme Court has determined, if police have probable cause to

search an automobile, they can conduct a warrantless search where the mobility of the vehicle
makes securing a warrant impractical. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
Also, the Supreme Court has held that if police have probable reason to search an auto when
it is stopped, they may then conduct a later search after the car has been taken into custody
and moved to a different location. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
In Fox v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367 (1972) and Vass v. Commonwealth,
214 Va. 740, 204 S.E.2d 280 (1974), the Virginia Supreme Court recently upheld warrantless
searches of automobiles.
42. Police in "hot pursuit" of criminals have not been required to secure warrants before
conducting searches for criminals or weapons. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
43. For a discussion of two recent Virginia decisions involving inventory searches and
warrantless administrative searches, see CriminalLaw-Survey of Developments in Virginia
Law: 1971-1972, 58 VA. L. REv. 1206, 1208-15 (1972).
44. The inadvertent discovery of items in "plain view" has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971). See also
Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 202 S.E.2d 894 (1974).

45. Chapter 6 deals with the interception of wire or oral communications and contains
essentially the same provisions as appeared in the previous Code.
46. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 863 (§ 19.2-71) with VA. CODE ANN. §
19.1-90 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
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7
arrested and brought before a court of appropriate jurisdiction.1

The revised sections also provide more guidance concerning the execution and return of a warrant or summons. Now an officer may execute
within his jurisdiction a warrant issued anywhere in the state, and the
warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the accused." If an individual
is arrested in a jurisdiction other than that in which the charge is to be
tried, the arresting officer shall bring the individual before a judicial officer
authorized to grant bail in the jurisdiction in which the arrest was made.
The judicial officer may then transfer the individual to the proper jurisdiction or admit him to bail. 9
As for the general duties of any officer making an arrest with a warrant,
Title 19.2 continues to require the arresting officer to bring the accused
before a judicial officer having authority to grant bail.5" However, the Code
now allows the judicial officer to either commit the accused to jail, admit
him to bail, or proceed to trial if the charge is a misdemeanor, the state
and accused consent, and the judicial officer is a judge of a court not of
record having jurisdiction in the matter.'
'Finally, the 1975 revision updates previous Code provisions by
authorizing police officers to arrest without a warrant individuals who
commit any crime in their presence or individuals whom the officer has
probable cause to believe have committed a felony not in his presence.2
This change finally recognizes the longstanding positions of both the
United States and Virginia Supreme Courts.13 Such legislative action will
allow the courts to interpret, on a case by case basis, these well-known
47. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 863 (§ 19.2-72) with VA. CODE ANN. §
19.1-91 (Repl. Vol. 1960). See VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:4(c)(1).
48. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 864 (§ 19.2-76).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 865 (§19.2-80) with VA. CODE ANN. §
19.1-98 (Repl. Vol. 1960). See VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:5(a)(1). Note the retention of the term
"court not of record."
52. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 865 (§ 19.2-81) with VA. CODE ANN. §
19.1-100 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
53. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld warrantless arrests of suspected
felons even when it appeared there was sufficient time before the arrest to obtain a warrant.
See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). The Virginia Supreme Court has
also followed this reasoning. See Crowder v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 151, 191 S.E.2d 239
(1972).
For a discussion of the common law rule concerning the warrantless arrest of suspected
felons see generally 5 AM. JuR. 2d Arrest § 24 (1962). See also Y. KAMsAR, W. LAFAvE, J.
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 283-86 (4th ed. 1974). For a general discussion and
collection of cases concerning warrantless arrests for misdemeanors see 5 AM. Jun. 2d Arrest
§§ 26 to 33 (1962).
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rules of arrest. It will relieve them of the task of laboriously framing the

rules themselves.
D.

BAIL AND RECOGNIZANCES

Section 19.2-120 in Chapter 954 of the revision directs that an accused
who is held pending trial shall be admitted to bail unless there is probable
cause to believe he will not appear at trial or unless his liberty constitutes
an unreasonable danger to the public. 5 This section is a new Code provision although it repeats language presently contained in the Virginia Supreme Court Rules." By authorizing a denial of bail to arrestees in noncapital cases, the Virginia General Assembly has accepted the extremely
controversial principle of preventive detention. The principle of preventive
detention, particularly the concept that an individual can be denied bail
solely on the determination that he is "dangerous," has evoked extensive
debate not only on its constitutionality but its efficacy."
The alarming point concerning the adoption of such a policy, is not the
fact that strong arguments have been made against it. Rather, it is the fact
that with little or no debate and discussion, the legislature has instituted
a system which rejects the traditional concepts of right to bail, the presumption of innocence," and bail's purpose of insuring the accused's pres54. Chapter 8 contains the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and contains no significant
changes from the previous Code.
55. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 870 (§ 19.2-120).
56. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:29.
57. For a general discussion of the arguments for and against preventive detention, see
Note, Preventive Detention and the ProposedAmendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966,
11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525 (1969). See also Ervin, The Legislative Role in Bail Reform, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1967); Foote, The Coming-ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail: I, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 959 (1965).
Professor Tribe of Harvard University argues rigorously against preventive detention. He
logically points out that a person who is detained prior to trial on the grounds that he is
dangerous, was probably just as dangerous before he was charged. Also, if he were to be
acquitted, again, he would be free but remain as dangerous as he was before trial. Thus, the
only logical justification for refusing bail for such a dangerous person, Tribes argues, is the
fact that he has been charged with a crime. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:PreventiveJustice
in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970).
Former Attorney General John Mitchell has argued in favor of the constitutionality of
preventive detention. See Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969).
58. In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) the United States Supreme Court noted that since
1789 federal law has unequivocally held that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall
be admitted to bail. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court stated:
This traditional right of freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to convic-
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ence at trial.59 It is also noteworthy that the 1975 revision does not have
any statutory standards to be utilized in determining whether an individual is "dangerous" or a "danger to the public." It appears that the judicial
officer will define these terms for himself.
Another new provision in the law of bail is section 19.2-121.11 This section
directs that, if an accused is admitted to bail, the official granting the bail
should consider in determining the terms (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense (2) the weight of the evidence (3) the financial ability to pay
bail and (4) the character of the accused. These factors are to be weighed
to determine an amount, reasonably calculated to insure the accused's
presence for trial.' Basing the test on the likelihood of the accused's appearance seems rather unusual in light of other portions of the revision.
First, section 19.2-123 states that any person accused of a non-capital
offense will be considered for release on his written promise to appear or
upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond. The judicial officer is
directed to consider eight factors in determining whether to allow the
individual such a pre-trial release. It is not clear why these factors, used
in determining if a person should be released on his own recognizance,
should not be exactly the same factors utilized to determine the amount
2
of bail required.
Secondly, it is difficult to determine why one Code provision requires
setting bail to insure the accused's presence, while the other provides for
preventive detention. Section 19.2-120 states a judge should not grant bail
at all if there is probable cause to believe an accused will not appear for
trial. Thus, it seems illogical that the revision requires determination of
bail in order to insure an accused's presence at trial, when under section
tion .... Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning. Id. at 4.
59. The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty....
[Tihe deposit of a sum of money serves as additional assurance of the presence of an
accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this

purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4-5.
60. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 870-71 (§ 19.2-121).

61. Id.
62. Id. (§19.2-123). The factors listed in section 19.2-123 are:
(a) nature and circumstances of the offense charged
(b) family ties
(c) employment

(d) financial resources
(e) length of residence in the community

(f) record of convictions
(g) any record of failures to appear at court in the past.
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19.2-120 the judge would have denied bail in the first place if there were
probable cause to believe the accused would flee. Moreover, having determined under section 19.2-120 that a person may be admitted to bail, since
there is no probable cause to believe he will not appear at trial, should not
the accused be assured a release on his own recognizance under 19.2-123?"
Finally, although section 19.2-120 indicates bail may be denied altogether due to an accused's danger to the public, section 19.2-121 gives no
indication that a person's dangerous nature should be considered in determining the amount of bail set. 4 It seems reasonable that if a person's
dangerous character could be a basis for denying him bail altogether, it
should be considered in determining the amount of bail.
The problems with bail and recognizance under Title 19.2 can be traced
to one major source. In 1973, the General Assembly had reformed the
Virginia bail system to broaden the methods available to judicial officers
to secure the accused's presence at trial.65 The Code provisions adopted at
that time were nearly identical to federal procedure provisions enacted in
the Bail Reform Act, 6 and these Code provisions remain in Title 19.2.
However, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 contemplates a right to bail in noncapital cases; there are no preventive detention provisions. With the adoption of a preventive detention statute in 1975 and the retention of Code
sections similar to those in the federal system, the 1975 revision raises
obvious problems of interpretation which should be remedied by the legislature rather than the courts.
Thus, in addition to the problems already mentioned, the legislature has
carelessly retained a section authorizing a denial of bail in capital cases
where the judicial officer has determined the accused is likely to flee or
present a danger to the community." This section (19.2-126) is similar to
the language in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, and is relevant only in a
system where there is a difference between right to bail in capital and noncapital cases. Since under section 19.2-120, any arrestee can be denied bail,
it follows that section 19.2-126 is a superfluous provision in the revised
Code.

63. Id.
64. Id. (§ 19.2-121). See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
65. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-109.1 to -109.9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1970). For a discussion of the 1973 bail reform in Virginia, see
CriminalProcedure-Surveyof Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 1478

(1973).
67. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 871-72 (§19.2-126).
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CHANGES IN GRAND JURY PROVISIONS

Among the most important changes regarding criminal procedure in
Virginia is the extensive revision of Chapter 13 relating to grand juries. 8
According to the Report of the Virginia Code Commission:
[S]ubstantial changes have been made in the revision, particularly with
respect to the special grand jury ....
The fundamental distinction between regular grand juries and special
grand juries has been retained-but the function, authority and power of,
and procedure before, the special grand jury, have been spelled out in detail."'
Unlike Chapter 13 of Title 19.1, the format of the revised chapter emphasizes the distinction between the two types of grand juries by dividing the
chapter into three articles: General, Regular Grand Juries, and Special
Grand Juries. In this manner, the recent legislation regarding grand juries
not only brings new rules of procedure into the Code, but organizes all the
rules into a more manageable form.
1.

General Changes

70
Article 1 begins by specifying the two-fold functions of the grand jury.
The function of considering bills of indictment to determine whether there
is probable cause to return such indictment as "a true bill" is reserved
solely for a regular grand jury.71 The second function, which may be exercised by either a regular or a special grand jury, is to investigate and report
on conditions which tend to promote criminal activity in the community
or which indicate misfeasance of governmental authority by governmental
agencies or their officials."

68. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 885 et seq. (§§ 19.2-191 to -215). For a history
of the grand jury in Virginia see Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. Rzv. 461
(1959), and for a survey of the laws relating to grand jury see Comment, The GrandJury in
Virginia, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 325 (1965).

69. CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, 5.
70. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 885 (§ 19.2-191).
71. Id. (§ 19.2-191(1)). In general, it is the duty of the grand jury to "inquire of and present
all felonies, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws committed within the jurisdiction of
the respective courts wherein it is sworn . . . "Id. at 887 (§ 19.2-200). The function of the
grand jury is merely accusatory; it does not hear the whole case. The state presents its
indictment, and the grand jury has only to say whether the accusation is well made and
properly to be tried. In so doing, the grand jury is recognized as a necessary protection to the
citizen against unfounded accusations and unjust prosecution. See Ex ParteBain, 121 U.S.
1 (1887).
72. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 885 (§ 19.2-191(2)). "It has long been the practice
in Virginia to impanel special grand juries ... to investigate unlawful conditions which have
become prevalent in the community. . . ." Benson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 744, 748, 58
S.E.2d 312, 313 (1950). The 1975 revision provides statutory authorization for this practice.
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Another new section in Article 1 provides that all proceedings during
sessions of the grand jury shall be kept secret by its members, with the
exception of the testimony of a witness who is later prosecuted for perjury
based on such testimony.73 In this respect the revision apparently differs
from the common7 4 law rule which allowed disclosure of evidence in the
court's discretion.
2. Regular Grand Jury Changes
Although the 1975 revisions are concerned primarily with special grand
juries, there are some changes regarding the number and terms of regular
grand juries.7 . Whereas Title 19.1 merely allowed a regular grand jury to
be convened at one term of the circuit court in each year, the new section
requires such a grand jury at each term of the circuit court, unless the court
finds it unnecessary or impractical to impanel a grand jury and enters an
order to that effect. 76 Provision is also made for more than one regular
77
grand jury in a particular term.
Additionally, the court must instruct the regular grand jury to decide
whether it desires to be impaneled as a special grand jury." If the jury or
73. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 885 (§ 19.2-192).

The nature and virility of the grand jury, as a common law institution, could be
seriously weakened if the privileged privacy and security of its hearings were readily
or freely withdrawn. Persons would be deterred, through fear of subsequent publicity
or possible reprisals, to reveal to the grand jury their knowledge of crime committed
or facts helpful in its detection. In re Disclosure of Evidence, 184 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.
Va. 1960).
A further reason for secrecy is to protect citizens against unfounded accusations and unjust
prosecution. See note 71 supra.
74. According to the common law rule:
[Tihe secrecy is not inviolable. Quite soundly, the sami.doctrine relaxes the injunction whenever the public interest would be better served by delivering up the grand
jury evidence. Resolution of the conflict has immemorially been entrusted to the court
of the grand jury. In re Disclosure of Evidence, 184 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1960).
Accord, VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:6(c).
75. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 885-86 (§ 19.2-193). Provisions relating to
selection, qualification, and deficiency in number of jurors, and those concerning the foreman
of the grand jury and the oaths of jurors and witnesses remain unchanged, as do procedural
provisions relating to regular grand juries. Id. at 886-87 (§§ 19.2-194 to -205).
76. Id. at 885-86 (§ 19.2-193).

77. Id.
78. Id. at 887 (§ 19.2-199). The heading of this section indicates a possibly unintended

omission regarding charging the grand jury in the presence of persons summoned as petit
jurors. The new section is partially based on VA. COD ANN. § 19.1-154 (Repl. Vol. 1960),
which provides that no petit juror
shall be present in the court room when said grand jury is charged; and the charging
of said grand jury in violation of this provision shall constitute reversible error in any
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any member thereof expresses the desire to investigate conditions promoting criminal activity or indicating governmental misfeasance,79 "then the
court shall impanel so many of the jury as answer in the affirmative, plus
any additional members as may be necessary to complete the panel, as a
special grand jury.""0
3.

Special Grand Jury Changes

Article 3 of Chapter 13, which concerns special grand juries, has virtually
all new provisions. 8 A special grand jury may be impaneled only for the
purpose of investigating conditions promoting criminal activity or indicating governmental misfeasance. 2 The composition of special grand juries
has been expanded to consist of not less than seven nor more than eleven
members from a list prepared by the court.83 Otherwise, qualifications are
the same as for regular grand jury members. 4
criminal case tried by a ... [petit jury].

This language does not appear in the body of the revised section although it is introduced in
the heading.
79. See Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 885 (§ 19.2-191(1)).
80. Id. at 887 (§ 19.2-200).
81. Id. at 887-88 (§§ 19.2-204 to -215).
Only in recent years have special grand juries been impaneled more than infrequently, and
their exact function and authority under the Code had remained unclear. However, recent
investigations by special grand juries in both Portsmouth and Richmond, which went far
beyond the traditional roles of the grand jury, illustrated the need for more explicit guidelines
on which a judge could base his instructions to such juries. It was in response to this need
that the new special grand jury provisions have been implemented. Telephone Interview with
Judge M. Ray Doubles, (ret.) in Richmond, June 13, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Doubles
Interview].
82. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 887 (§ 19.2-206). This provision preempts the
common law rule that a special grand jury is qualified to perform any business that may
properly come before it, and generally has the same powers as a regular grand jury. See
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. Dec. 851, 852, 20 S.E. 362, 363 (1894); Lyles v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 396, 13 S.E. 802 (1891).
83. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 887-88 (§ 19.2-207). Selection of special grand
jury members from a list prepared by the court was provided for in Title 19.1, and this
practice has been uniformly sustained by the Virginia Supreme Court. Benson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 744, 748, 58 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1950).
The rationale for increasing the number of jurors on special grand juries and widening the
range between the minimum and maximum number was to give added flexibility to the
special grand jury which must consider a wide variety of unique cases. Doubles Interview,
supra note 81. The number of jurors on a regular grand jury remains the same as in the former
provision which did not differentiate regular and special grand juries in regard to number.
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-150 (Cum.Supp. 1975) with Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch.
495, at 886 (§ 19.2-195).
84. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 887 (§ 19.2-207). For qualifications of regular
grand jury members, see id. at 886 (§ 19.2-194).
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In order to perform its function the special grand jury has been granted
the power to subpoena persons to appear and testify, and to produce specified records, papers, and documents." After interviews with the members
of the Richmond and Portsmouth special grand juries, the Code Commission discovered that they had been severely handicapped without such
powers. Vesting the special grand jury with subpoena power would help
achieve the revision's goal of granting "mechanical independence" from
the court.86
Before a witness testifies, he must be warned by the foreman regarding
his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination, that he may have
counsel present during his appearance to testify, and that he may later be
called upon to testify in a case growing out of the investigation and report
of the special grand jury." A review of investigations by special grand juries
indicated that witnesses were giving conflicting testimony in cases growing
out of the investigations. This last warning is designed to eliminate the
temptation of giving inaccurate testimony by making the witness aware
that he may later be called upon to testify again under oath in open court.88
The new legislation embodies several other measures to expedite the
work of the special grand jury while preserving its independence. The new
rule relating to the presence of the attorney for the Commonwealth distinguishes the investigatory and the deliberative stages of special grand jury
sessions. In the former stage he may be present only when requested or
when the special grand jury was impaneled upon his motion.89 Except when
his legal advice is requested, the attorney for the Commonwealth may not
be present after the investigatory stage while the jury is "discussing, evaluating, or considering the testimony of a witness, or deliberating in order
to reach a decision or prepare its report.""
Formerly, the Commonwealth's attorney often went before the grand
jury. If, in his opinion, the public interest would b promoted thereby, or
if called upon by the foreman, the Commonwealth's attorney would appear
to advise and assist the grand jury in the discharge of their official duties. 1
This practice was preempted by a statute which practically terminated the
Commonwealth's attorney's appearances.2 The present statute incorpo85. Id. at 888 (§ 19.2-208).
86. Doubles Interview, supra note 81.
87. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 888 (§ 19.2-208); cf. United States v. Scully,
225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
88. Doubles Interview, supra note 81.
89. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 888 (§ 19.2-210).

90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 573, 10 S.E. 840 (1890).
92. VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.1-156 (Repl. Vol. 1960). The statute provided:
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rates this older language while anticipating new circumstances under
which the Commonwealth's attorney may be present. The purpose of the
statute is to give the grand jury the benefit of his professional advice and
at the same time "to preserve privacy of deliberation and independence of
action by the grand jurors, free from outside control or influence." 93
Article 3 also allows the court to designate special counsel and other
appropriate personnel to assist the special grand jury in its work. 4 A court
reporter may be present to record all testimony, but he is to be excluded
from deliberations. 5 The transcripts are for the exclusive use of the grand
jury and are to be sealed, dated, and delivered to the court when they are
no longer needed. The court is directed to keep safely these materials for
three years and after such time has elapsed to destroy them unless within7
that time a witness before the special grand jury is prosecuted for perjury.
In that event the materials shall be accessible to prosecution and defense
and admissible at the trial.9
A final section delineating the powers and functions of the special grand
jury provides that, in contrast to a regular grand jury, a special grand jury
does not file a presentment, or indictment, but rather a "report" including
its recommendations. 9 Thereafter it is discharged"'9 and any bill of indictment which follows from the report is prepared by the Commonwealth's
No attorney for the Commonwealth shall go before any grand jury during their deliberations except when duly sworn as a witness, but he may advise the foreman of the
grand jury or any member or members thereof in relation to the discharge of their
duties.
93. Draper v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 657, 111 S.E. 471, 473 (1922).
94. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 888 (§ 19.2-211). Compare VA. SuP. CT. R.
3A:6(b), promulgated in 1973, stating that only the grand jurors, the witness under examination, and if directed by the court, an interpreter may be present during the hearing of evidence
and that only the grand jurors may be present during their deliberations and voting. Since
in the past judges have followed this rule implicitly, the Code Commission asked the legislature to give statutory consent to solicitation of outside aid in order to facilitate the special
grand jury's investigation. The type of personnel and instances contemplated include an
accountant in embezzlement cases or a detective in drug abuse cases. Doubles Interview,
supra note 81.
95. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 888 (§ 19.2-212).
96. Id.
97. Id. A difference of opinion among the members of the Code Commission regarding the
use and disposition of these transcripts produced this compromise between immediate destruction to insure the secrecy of the proceedings and preservation of the materials for use in
perjury prosecutions as a deterrent to giving inaccurate testimony. Doubles Interview, supra
note 81.
98. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 888 (§ 19.2-212).
99. Id. (§ 19.2-213).
100. Id.
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attorney for presentation to a regular grand jury.101

F. TIME LIMITATIONS ON THE PROSECUTIONS OF FELONIES
The 1975 revision concerning time limitations on felony prosecutions
was designed "both to clarify the 1974 version and to cover situations not
covered in [that] statute." ' 2 While the pre-1974 statute's use of a terms03
of-court formula"
had been upheld as a reasonable legislative interpretation of what constitutes a "speedy trial," ' 4 it was held that the procedural
application of the statute may result in the deprivation of an individual's
sixth amendment rights."'
Under the new statute, a person held continuously in custody after a
district court has found probable cause that he has committed a felony is
forever discharged from prosecution if no trial is commenced within five
months. ' If the person is not held in custody but has been recognized for
his appearance, he is discharged after nine months without trial.1 7If there
is no preliminary hearing or if it is waived, the five or nine month periods
commence at the date of indictment or presentment against the accused.' 8
However, if the accused is not under arrest at the time the indictment or
presentment is found against him, the five and nine month periods com101. Id. (§ 19.2-214).
102. CODE CONMI'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-191 (Cum.
Supp. 1975) and Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 893 (§ 19.2-243).
103. The statute prior to the 1974 amendment provided for perpetual discharge of the
accused from felony prosecution "if there be three regular terms of the circuit or four of the
corporation or hustings court in which the case is pending after,he is so held without
trial . . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-191 (Repl.Vol. 1960). The object of the statute was to
secure a speedy trial to the accused and to guard against protracted imprisonment or harassment by criminal prosecution. Mealy v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 216, 68 S.E.2d 507 (1952).
104. Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (1945). See also Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where the Supreme Court rejected a set time limit rule in favor
of a balancing test involving four factors to determine if the accused had been denied a speedy
trial: 1) length of the delay, 2) reason for the delay, 3) defendant's assertion or failure to assert
his right, and 4) possible prejudice to the defendant from delay. However, the opinion adds
that "[t]he States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards. . . ." Id. at 523. The American Bar Association has recommended a set
time limit of six months. American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial 14-16 (Approved Draft 1968).
105. Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D. Va. 1972). The application of the terms-ofcourt formula resulted in a lack of uniformity and in some instances in detention without trial
for as long as a year or more. A rural circuit may have fewer than the requisite terms in a
year while an urban circuit might have as many as ten. Doubles Interview, supra note 81.
106. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 893 (§ 19.2-243).
107. Id. The 1974 amendment required a nine month period without trial whether the
accused was in custody or not. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-191 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
108. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 893 (§ 19.2-243).
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mence upon his arrest.'9 Finally, the time periods provided for do not
include delay attributable to certain causes."'
G.

OTHER CHANGES IN TITLE

19.1

The 1975 revision includes changes dealing with presentments, indictments, and informations which constitute the subject matter of Chapter
14."'1 The chapter begins with a codification of the common law definitions
of indictment, presentment and information. Accordingly, if the grand jury
presents of their own knowledge, it is a presentment only. If they act on
the knowledge of others, it is an indictment.' 2 An information is an accusation in the nature of an indictment from which it differs only in its being
presented by a competent public officer on his oath of office, instead of a
grand jury on their oath."'
Elsewhere in the chapter are provisions that in perjury indictments, for
giving conflicting testimony under oath on separate occasions, it is unnecessary to allege which statement made by the accused was false.", Furthermore, the section on amendment of indictments no longer distinguishes
amendment procedure for felony and misdemeanor offenses."' It allows
amendment for defects in form or variances in proof at any time before the
trier of fact determines guilt or innocence.' 6
Another significant section in the 1975 revision concerns process on indictment or presentment for misdemeanors.17 The revised section termi109. Id.

110. Id. In general terms these subsections include delay caused by insanity of the accused,
sickness or accident, separate trial of a person jointly indicted, continuance, escape, failure
to appear according to his recognizance, and inability of the jury to agree in their verdict.
111. Id. at 889-91 (§§ 19.2-216 to -230).
112. See United States v. Mundel, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 245 (1795).
113. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 733 (1871).
114. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 890 (§ 19.2-222). The substantive offense is set
out in id. ch. 15, at 175 (§ 18.2-435).
115. Id. ch. 495 at 891 (§ 19.2-231). At common law an indictment could not "be changed
or altered in the slightest degree by any power after it [had] been returned into court and
the grand jury [had been] discharged." Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 507,
512, 86 Am. Dec. 722, 724 (1860).
Title 19.1 allowed amendment of indictments for misdemeanors at any time before judgment was entered as long as the offense charged was not changed. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-175
(Repl. Vol. 1960). Procedure for amendment of felony indictments depended on whether or
not the defendant had pleaded. Before pleading, the state could amend as long as it did not
change the character of the offense charged. Id. § 19.1-176. After pleading, however, only
the court could amend and only for defects in form or to conform to variances between allegations and evidence, as long as the nature of the offense was not changed. Id. § 19.1-177.
116. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 891 (§ 19.2-231).
117. Id. at 892 (§ 19.2-237).
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nates the practice of implying a guilty plea if defendant did not appear to
defend certain misdemeanor charges.' 8 The more modem view seems to
be that implying such a plea violates the accused's right to be confronted
by witnesses against him."' Under Title 19.2,12o a motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only before sentencing or
suspension of sentence, except that within 21 days the court may set aside
a conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea in order to
correct manifest injustice.' Furthermore, there is a prohibition against
unreasonable delay between a finding of guilty and sentencing, or suspension thereof.'22 In the interim the accused may be jailed or bail may be
continued or altered. 12 Before pronouncing sentence a court must inquire
whether the accused wishes to make a statement or give any reason why
2
judgment should not be pronounced against him.'
Finally, the revised Code provides that after a finding of guilty, the court
may direct a probation officer to make a presentence investigation and
report.'1 The accused may demand the same after pleading guilty and
being convicted of a felony punishable by death or confinement for more
than 10 years.' 8 The same section outlines the required contents of the
probation officer's report and by whom it should be filed. The report must
be presented by the probation officer in open court in the presence of the
accused, who shall be advised of its contents. The accused may crossexamine the probation officer regarding the report and present additional
facts bearing upon a proper sentence.'2
118. The prior statute distinguished offenses in Chapter 7 of Title 18.1 from other misdemeanors. The change reflects the theory that there should be no presumption of a confession
from the mere fact of the accused's absence and that the state should still have the burden

of proving guilt. Doubles Interview, supra note 81.
119. But see Shiflett v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 386, 18 S.E. 838 (1894).
120. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 900-02 (§§ 19.2-295 to -310).
121. Id. at 900 (§ 19.2-296). Although this provision and following ones are new to the Code,
they have been standard procedure in Virginia courts and have been lifted almost word-forword from VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:25.

122. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 495, at 900 (§ 19.2-298).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 900-01 (§ 19.2-299).
126. Id.
127. Id.

